The nationalism-postnationalism axis and the gradual transformation of ideological space in Europe: Evidence from party discourse in Euromanifestos from six European countries

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Eftichia Teperoglou
Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES), University of Mannheim, Germany
&
Institute of Greek Politics, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Athens, Greece

Emmanouil Tsatsanis
Institute of Greek Politics, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Athens, Greece

Eftichia.Teperoglou@mzes.uni-mannheim.de etsats@gmail.com

*Draft Paper. Comments and suggestions are most welcome*
Abstract

This paper investigates the thesis about the growing politicization of issues pertaining to European integration and/or globalization and the ensuing polarization dynamic within European political systems between supporters and foes of the latter processes. Our main research hypothesis is that even though European integration and globalization constitute multifaceted and diffuse processes, preferences of political actors on issues related to the challenges and opportunities of globalization will tend to manifest clear tendencies of consistent directionality across distinct economic, cultural and political domains. We test this hypothesis by examining Euromanifestos data from six European countries (Germany, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece and Hungary) for a time frame of up to thirty years (for Germany and the United Kingdom), beginning with the first European elections in 1979. We apply multidimensional unfolding, which allows us to depict in a joint low-dimensional space the relative positions of both political parties and ideological categories. Our findings largely support the hypothesis that components of a nationalism-postnationalism divide tend to transform the content of the traditional cultural-political dimension.

Keywords: Euromanifestos; party competition; ideological space; globalization; Germany; UK; Netherlands; Italy; Greece; Hungary
Conceptual framework

The political science literature on the dimensionality of ideological space and political competition in contemporary democracies stretches back (at least) to the middle of the previous century with the median voter theorem (Black 1958) and its familiar assumption about the unidimensionality (e.g. left-right dimension) of ideological space. However, cursory as well as more systematic observations of party coalition strategies or parties' policy preferences (e.g. Budge et al. 1987), suggested that assumptions about the unidimensionality of ideological space did not conform well with the realities observed in most political systems. As a result, the assumption of multidimensionality of ideological space has become a staple for most subsequent analyses. Such approaches have been also undoubtedly buoyed by Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) influential work on cleavages which, as is well known, identified four main dimensions of societal conflict in West European societies that, in turn, gave rise to political parties with particularistic policy agendas.

As the literature on cleavages investigates the links between demand-side and supply-side politics, it is no surprise that the identification of structural transformations in Western societies has prompted new analyses of the major divisions in contemporary political systems. Technological changes, the reorganization of economic production and the increased significance of the ever expanding middle class have supposedly dulled the classic capital-labor conflict. In addition, economic growth, increased affluence levels and the rapid expansion of education have created a secularizing dynamic and a purported generational value shift (Inglehart 1977). Hypotheses that new cleavages are gradually replacing older ones, or that simply traditional cleavages are in decline (e.g. Franklin et al. 1992), abound in the relevant literature. The new divisions might reflect divergence of interests within the middle class (e.g. Kriesi 1998) or the emergence of new value conflicts and divergence of interests within the middle class. There has been an array of labels intended to capture these new cleavages: left libertarianism vs. right authoritarianism (Kitschelt 1995), new left vs. new right (Flanagan 1987; Flanagan and Lee 2003), materialist vs. postmaterialist (Inglehart 1977, 1990). These new conflicts are not supposed to have added any fundamentally new dimension of conflict into the political space but merely transformed the meaning of the two
already existing ones (Kriesi et al. 2008: 13). In other words, all cleavages, whether the old Rokkanian ones or the newer ones, essentially boil down to two dimensions of conflict: an economic conflict over distributional preferences, reflecting a divergence of objective material interests; and a cultural-political conflict informed by fundamental value divides (e.g. religiosity vs. secularism).

The latest structural transformations that are supposed to rearrange the configuration of national cleavage structures are associated with the process of globalization. The assumption underlying this thesis is that as the impact of globalization in its various aspects (economic, cultural and political) can assume a diversity of forms for the different members of a national community, they create new disparities and new forms of conflict. Citizens will tend to perceive these differences in terms of 'winners' and 'losers' of globalization and that the aspirations or grievances of these competing groups will be articulated by political parties (Kriesi et al. 2008: 3). Following this line of reasoning, this paper investigates the thesis about the growing politicization of issues pertaining to European integration and/or globalization and the ensuing polarization dynamic within European political systems between supporters and foes of the latter processes. Our main research hypothesis is that even though European integration and globalization constitute multifaceted and diffuse processes, preferences of political actors on issues related to the challenges and opportunities of globalization will tend to manifest clear tendencies of consistent directionality across distinct economic, cultural and political domains. In other words, we posit that there is a unidimensional underlying ideological axis that we call the nationalism-postnationalism axis that can be used to aggregate consonant predispositions in issues as seemingly disparate as the strengthening of EU institutions and perceived challenges to national sovereignty, attitudes towards immigrants and the perceived erosion of national identity, as well as market integration and trade liberalization. In addition, we expect that this dimension is aligned with the traditional cultural-political issue-dimension within the ideological space and that, as the effects of globalization are becoming increasingly felt by national populations around the world, they are gradually redefining the content of the cultural-political dimension. We hold the same expectation for the economic dimension of the nationalism-postnationalism axis and, for this reason, we have conceptualized and operationalized distinct categories for economic integration and economic liberalism, even though the two
are often conceptually and operationally collapsed. We argue that the issue of economic integration is fundamentally a boundary issue, not unlike the cultural and political components of the globalization divide, and that orientations in favor or against stem from shared ideological predispositions on the broader question of community demarcation vs. integration.

We test this hypothesis by examining the programmatic commitments of political parties from six European countries (Germany, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece and Hungary) as expressed in their European election manifestos. We employ data from the Euromanifestos/PIREDEU project and the time frame of our study covers up to thirty years (for Germany and the United Kingdom), beginning with the first European elections in 1979. For our data analysis we apply a multidimensional unfolding technique, which allows us to depict in a joint low-dimensional space the relative positions of both political parties and ideological categories.

In the following section we present in detail our research strategy and design, which provides an overview of the Euromanifestos data and focuses the discussion on the operationalization of our main ideological categories and the selected method of analysis. Then we proceed with a discussion of the national context and country-specific hypotheses for each of the six countries of our sample, before moving on the presentation of our findings.

**Research strategy and design**

Our paper focuses on four main objectives. The first and overarching one is to examine the *structure* of the ideological space of different party systems and, subsequently, the *position* of our globalization-related issues within this space. Another main objective is to measure the *salience* of the debate around these issues for each political party and to identify possible trends of growing politicization surrounding globalization. Moreover, we attempt to locate the exact position of all relevant political parties within the national ideological space by examining that proximity between political parties and particular issues. Finally, we attempt to offer more nuanced readings of contextual factors for each national political system in an attempt to anticipate findings that contradict our main expectations about the unidimensionality and/or alignment of the nationalism-postnationalism axis.
Selection of data

Our analysis focuses exclusively on the supply-side of party competition. Undoubtedly, the demand-side of electoral competition, consisting of the policy preferences of the electorate, is a crucial component of the complete equation that captures major changes in the ideological space. A cross-national analysis with a longitudinal perspective that covers both sides of the equation would obviously be a tall order given the space limitations of this paper and, for this reason, we have decided to focus our analysis exclusively on parties' policy positions.

The first and most important step of our study design was to make an appropriate choice of data in order to estimate the policy positions of political actors, in accordance with our research questions and with the availability of data for the selected time frame. Over the past twenty-five years or so, different methodological attempts have been made to locate the positions of political actors in policy/ideological spaces. Peter Mair has offered an overview of the main approaches on measuring political space, trying also to comment on their limitations and possibilities (2001: 10). Mair's review covers: a) the use of a priori judgements, the oldest approach to locating parties in a given policy space; b) secondary reading; c) perception of party positions expressed in mass surveys; d) elite studies; and, finally, the two most dominant approaches, e) the analysis of party programmes and manifestos and f) expert surveys (Mair 2001). At this point, we could also include a recent approach on the measuring of the supply-side of ideological space, the content analysis of articles in major daily newspapers based on human coding (Dolezal 2008a:67-71).

The empirical investigation of our study rests on an analysis of party manifestos from European Parliament elections (hereafter: EP elections) taken from six different countries. ¹ It should be noted that this constitutes an innovative aspect as our analysis is based on party programmes for second-order (EP) national elections, unlike previous studies that employ strictly "first-order" elections. We have used the database of the “Euromanifesto Project” (EMP) at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES) for the time period of 1979-2004; for

¹ In some countries parties do not distribute a proper Euromanifesto. In this case, the coders of each country were asked to find and code another ‘official’ election-related party document (e.g. press release), a manifesto of the party leader, an excerpt of the national manifesto -in case of concurrent national elections only, or (under justification) another document summarizes the statements of the party’s policy positions. For more details, see: The Euromanifestos Handbook 2009 (Euromanifestos Coding Scheme/ EMCS III), p. 4.
the Euromanifestos of 2009, the available database of the Manifesto study 2009 was analyzed. The roots of the EMP go back to the flagship study of party manifestos for national elections, the cross-national “Manifesto Research Group” (MRG)/Comparative Manifestos Project” (CMP).

The starting theoretical and analytical point for the content analysis of manifestos is that the (human) coding is based on the assumptions of the saliency theory of party competition (Robertson 1976, Budge et al. 1987; Klingemann et al. 1994). The theory posits that the relative policy position of parties can be determined by the emphasis they place on each issue, not necessarily on the articulation of an explicit position, which the theory assumes is more or less the same for all parties. Several critiques have been levelled against the MRG/CMP project over the years. Perhaps the most important are that manifestos have a soft-focus effect - meaning that parties avoid clear statements - and that voters tend to not read manifestos (Dolezal 2008a: 67). Nevertheless, there are many benefits from using manifesto data. Braun et al. (2010:5) emphasize inter alia that the party manifestos cover a wide range of themes, problems and political positions. Changes of issue emphases and policy positions of parties can be studied in a diachronic and cross-national perspective.

Selection of countries, parties and time-frame of the study

One of our goals was to select a sample of countries that reflect the diversity of socio-economic and cultural contexts in Europe. For this reason we have decided to select EU–member states from Western, Southern and Eastern Europe: Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. This particular group of countries allows for variation in national levels of pro- and anti-European attitudes at the level of public opinion, level of economic development, as well as status of net beneficiary vs. net contributor within the European Union (see Table 1).

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3 The Euromanifesto Project started in 2000, when Prof. Hermann Schmitt (MZES) started to apply the MRG/CMP approach of analyzing party manifesto content to European Parliament elections. For more details go online at: http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/projekte/manifestos/ and also see Wüst and Volkens (2003), ‘Euromanifesto Coding Instructions’, MZES Working Paper, 64.
At this point, it should also be mentioned that for the final selection of these countries we had to take into account the issue of data availability. As one of our aims is to study the transformation of ideological space over time, the first EP election of 1979 is the starting point for our analysis, until the 2009 EP election. Nevertheless, it was necessary to adjust this time frame for some cases. Only in Germany and UK there is a consistent time-series of selected and coded Euromanifestos for (at least) all major parties from 1979 to 2009, which allowed the study of the basic structure of ideological space of the party system at a given time and which constitutes our threshold criterion for the inclusion of an election in our study. Based on this criterion, the final time-frame for each of the other countries is as follows: Germany and UK (1979-2009); the Netherlands and Italy (1994-2009); Greece (1999-2009) and Hungary (2004-2009).

Another central question of our study design concerns the selection of the parties. On one hand, the Euromanifestos project research team defined as relevant parties in the EU those that have been represented in the European Parliament at least once (Braun et al. 2010: 4-5). On the other hand, the criteria that have been used in the MRG/CMP projects are based on the argument that, in general, the relevance of parties is given both by their representation in the national parliament and on the blackmail potential of a party in a given party system (Sartori 1976). For the purposes of our analysis, we decided to follow a middle-of-the-road approach. Our basic and most important criterion that we employ to designate a party as 'relevant' is representation in the European Parliament as a result of the specific election under consideration. Only for some elections, we have decided to follow a mixed criterion, which is to include in our analysis some parties that were not able to obtain a seat at EP, but their role in the immediately preceding national 'first-order' elections was decisive. For example, we have included the List Pim Fortuyn in Netherlands for the 2004 EP election, even though they failed to gain a seat in that electoral contest, but their performance in the 2002 parliamentary elections had been responsible for the description of that contest as the 'earthquake' election of the Dutch political system.

**Operationalization of ideological categories**

As is well known, the scores in the Euromanifestos dataset represent percentages of political arguments (quasi-sentences) related to particular issues within each
manifesto. Because of differences in the length of the documents, the number of quasi-sentences in each category is standardized in order to make coded manifestos comparable. The proposed Euromanifesto Coding Scheme (EMCS) includes a range of policy domains: external relations, freedom and democracy, political system, economy, welfare and quality of life, fabric of society and social groups. They are further divided into several content categories and sub-categories.

We have selected only a subgroup of categories for our analysis, which are then regrouped into nine distinct categories that denote more abstract ideological orientations: economic liberalism, welfare state economy, fiscal conservatism, cultural liberalism, socio-political authoritarianism, environmentalism, economic integration, Euroscepticism, and nativism. The particular issues and the broader ideological categories were selected in an attempt to satisfy two main criteria: a) ideological clarity, in terms of selecting categories of issues that correspond more clearly to the two main dimensions of political competition as identified in the beginning of the paper (socio-economic and cultural-political), plus the nationalism-postnationalism divide that constitutes the focus of our study; b) conceptual congruence, in terms of striking the best possible balance between more abstract ideological categories (e.g. economic liberalism) and concrete policy issues (e.g. privatization). We achieved the latter by selecting issues with detailed definitions (in the Euromanifestos codebook) that were unambiguously associated with one of our nine categories. Some issues were excluded due to the fact that components of their definitions had no direct relevance with our strictly defined ideological category, even in cases where the title of the issue-category at first appeared relevant. We decided, at this stage, against pursuing a more inductive approach by applying data reduction techniques on the entire group of available issue-categories in the Euromanifesto dataset for the construction of our ideological categories. Such an approach would have probably allowed us to employ additional issues from the dataset in our analysis and to quantitatively identify underlying factors, surely at the cost of greater conceptual stretching and lower content validity for our composite categories (cf. Ray 2007: 12; Keman 2007: 78).

As mentioned above, following our first criterion we have created categories that correspond to the two classic dimensions related to economic and cultural-political issues, plus the 'globalization' dimension: a) economic liberalism, welfare state economy, and fiscal conservatism correspond to the economic dimension; b)
cultural liberalism, socio-political authoritarianism, and environmentalism correspond to the (broadly defined) cultural-political dimension, which includes the 'new politics' dimension; and c) economic integration, Euroscepticism, nativism capture the economic, political and cultural dimension of our nationalism-postnationalism axis.

The nine ideological categories are defined in such a way that they indicate clear directionality. More specifically, we have distinguished between positive and negative references for all the selected issues. It should be noted that a major benefit of using the dataset of the Euromanifestos project, in comparison to the MRG/CMP, is that the direction of parties’ statements is documented in most of its categories. Table 2 lists and describes in detail the nine ideological categories, including the particular issues that form the components of each category. The nine ideological categories are computed by summing up all the positive references and subtracting the negative ones. We have applied this formula to all the relevant parties of each country and for each EP election.

Method of analysis
We selected multidimensional unfolding as our main method of analysis due to the appropriateness of the method when trying to represent the relative positioning of ideological categories and parties in a low-dimensional space. The capacity to locate political parties and specific ideological categories within a common space allows us to compare parties and party systems both cross-nationally and over time. Perhaps most importantly, the visualization of the structure of the ideological space and the place of parties within it produces easily interpretable findings. Multidimensional unfolding (MDU) can be seen as a special case of multidimensional scaling (MDS), where the within-sets proximities are missing (Borg and Groenen 2005: 293) - in our case proximities between parties and between ideological categories respectively. Instead, our data represent only between-sets proximities, that is proximities between parties and ideological categories.

MDU is best applied when the data constitute preference scores (such as rank-orders of preference) of different individuals (or, in our case, political parties) for a set of choice objects (in our case, ideological categories) (Borg and Groenen 2005: 293). Therefore, based on the scores that we obtained on each of our ideological
categories for each party, we have ranked ideological-preferences for each of our parties in each separate election, in order to obtain the initial unweighted proximities between parties and ideological categories. In order to account not only for the similarities between pairs of objects (parties and ideological categories), but also for the salience of these relationships, we have used the measure of this salience (i.e. the frequency of the entire set of quasi-sentences used per ideological category by each political party) as a weight that adjusts the original proximity between party and ideological category. As a result, the distances on the joint space corresponding to salient relationships between parties and ideological categories will be more accurate than the less salient ones (cf. Dolezal 2008: 72). In addition, we employ the same frequencies to examine in separate tables salience trends for the three ideological categories that are associated with our nationalism-postnationalism axis. Even though all our unfolding solutions are completed for a two-dimensional space following our main hypotheses, we do not simply assume that the optimal dimensionality of the ideological space will be the same for every single election. We run each unfolding model for different number of dimensions and use badness-of-fit values (Kruskal’s Stress-1) to gauge the optimal dimensionality of the unfolding model.


In this section we offer a discussion of the historical background, national context and country-specific hypotheses for each of the six countries of our sample, before moving on the presentation of our findings.

Germany

In the relevant literature, the German party system is typically described as being historically dominated by two cleavages: class and religion (Urwin 1974; Dolezal 2008). Perhaps the only qualification that should be added is that the religious cleavage of Protestants vs. Catholics early on in the post-war period transformed into a religious-secular (or church-state in Rokkanean terms) cultural cleavage, with the CDU expanding its appeal to both religious Catholics and Protestants. Even though pre-1990 studies inevitably focus solely on West Germany, the structure of the German system did not really change after unification. The main
legacy of unification has been the emergence of a national party of the post-communist left (PDS/Die Linke). However, the long lasting three-party format (SPD, CDU/CSU, FDP) had already come to an end with the advent of the Greens onto the political scene in the 1980s.

The fact that the two traditional cleavages have tended to not overlap but to be orthogonal, means that polarization has never been an enduring feature of German political life. So long as the party system retained its three-party configuration, it constituted a classic case of a centripetal two-and-a-half party system, with the smaller FDP serving as coalition partner for both the larger SPD and CDU/CSU. This triangular arrangement was possible due to the convergence between FDP and CDU/CSU on 'bourgeois values' and between SPD and FDP on 'socio-liberal values' (Pappi 1984). The emergence of the Green party created a preferred coalition partner for the SPD and made the FDP the default coalition partner for the Union parties. In addition, there were signs of decline for two-partyism, with the SPD and CDU/CSU consistently capturing lower combined percentages in comparison to the 1970s (Smith 2003: 83). In terms of the ideological and political space, there was also the question of whether the emergence of the Green party was the harbinger of a fundamental shift in German politics, whereby a new value division would gradually replace older ones (Dalton 1984) or the new conflict would overlap and be absorbed by the traditional left-right cleavage (Pappi 1984).

Moving on to the nationalism-postnationalism divide (in this case labeled 'demarcation-integration' divide), most authors agree that the issues political integration at the European level did not prove to be a particularly polarizing issue for German political parties (Dolezal: 213). On the other hand, reactions against EU enlargement and the European monetary union are issues that have gained traction with the German electorate in recent years (Busch and Knelangen 2004). However, none of the small parties that endorse 'hard' Eurosceptic positions (such as the Republikaner) have been well rewarded at the polls. Of the relevant parties, PDS/Die Linke is perhaps the most consistently critical party of the 'neoliberal' character of European economic integration, without, however, rejecting the project of European unification. In contrast, immigration has emerged as a hot-button issue, with CDU and (especially) CSU becoming more attuned with the growing anti-immigration and culturally protectionist sentiments across the country.
We expect the German system to be structured by two conflicts: the socio-economic one and a second one dominated by traditional cultural-political issues (political authoritarianism and cultural liberalism). However, we expect the 'new politics' environment category to be increasingly signifying the cultural-political conflict after the growth of the Green party in the late 1980s. In relation to the nationalism-postnationalism axis, we hypothesize that cultural threats induced by globalization (reflected in our nativism category) will mainly contribute to the content of the vertical dimension, whereas euroscepticism is not anticipated to be a polarizing category due to the overwhelmingly pro-European tendencies of the German party system as a whole.

**United Kingdom**

Open any textbook on British politics and in the opening paragraphs you will find, almost without exception, a similar introductory note. For the most part of the past century or so, British politics has been dominated by the class cleavage. With the extension of suffrage and the replacement of the Liberal party by the Labour party after the end of World War I as the main alternative to Conservative rule, the political system became, even more acutely, an institutional arena for the representation of socio-economic class interests. However, class is not the only durable feature of the British political system. The United Kingdom has always been a multi-ethnic state and, in more recent decades, with the advent of the Scottish and Welsh nationalist parties has acquired a more fully developed form of the center-periphery cleavage. Hoping to facilitate the comparative aspect of our analysis, we have decided to focus only on the national relevant parties. Due to the fact that the unit of analysis in this paper is 'second-order' elections, we have already included a greater number of parties (addition of Greens, UKIP and BNP) than what we would normally have, had we focused on national elections instead. The gradual tendency towards fragmentation and multipartyism for the once classical two-party system certainly appears more accelerated when focusing solely on EP elections.

Undoubtedly, the past three decades has been an era of great transformation for the British party system. There has been a proliferation of parties (including the resurgence of the Liberals) and a steady decline for the combined percentages of the Conservative and Labour parties. After a near two-decade hegemonic period for the Conservative party that was marked by intense ideological polarization, the (New)
Labour party moderated its image fashioning third-way politics under Tony Blair, and managed to kick off its own successful run that terminated in 2009 for EP elections and in 2010 for national elections. Going back to the 1980s, the British ideological space appeared to be quite straightforward, largely thanks to Margaret Thatcher's electorally triumphant neoliberal project. The Conservatives under Thatcher had launched a true ideological revolution, combining an extreme - for the time - economically liberal agenda with socially conservative rhetoric (cf. Kelly 2003: 255-257; Hall 1988). This innovation had not only polarized but also simplified the structure of ideological space in Britain, with the broader left-right dimension signifying the entire British political universe.

Even back then, however, one could detect the first few signs of a new set of issues that was gradually coming to the center of political discourse. As the process of European integration intensified in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, Europeanization-related issues started to compete with classic distributional issues in political interest terms. European integration awakened deeply-held prejudices toward continental powers and politics and, in addition, influx rates of immigration increased once again after a three-decade hiatus in the 1990s (Kriesi and Frey 2008b: 190), raising anxieties concerning the integrity of the British social fabric and culture. We expect that the British political system will be structured primarily by the socio-economic dimension, especially in the pre-1990s period. Following the findings of Kriesi and Frey (2008b) we expect that a second dimension will be dominated by classic cultural-political categories (i.e. cultural liberalism vs. authoritarianism), only to be gradually replaced in the 1990s by globalization-related issues, and especially the euroscepticism category. The fact that we are working with Euromanifestos data (combined with the inclusion in our analysis of the Green party, UKIP and even BNP in 2009), lead us to expect a comparatively higher salience of the euroscepticism and economic integration categories, as they are the two categories which include the EU-related issues.

Netherlands

In most studies of politics in the Netherlands some well-known distinct characteristics of Dutch society are highlighted. The most important of these is that “the Netherlands is a country of minorities” (Andeweg and Irwin 2005:19, Kriesi and Frey 2008a: 154). Up to the mid-1960s, the society was traditionally divided
into four different subcultures that formed closed social groupings called "zuilen" (pillars). There were four main pillars, each corresponding to a major subculture in the country: the Catholics, the Calvinists, the Socialists, and the Liberals (with the latter belonging to the so-called 'general' pillar). This unique feature of organizational pillarization, the so-called 'verzuiling' (e.g. Andeweg and Irwin 2005:25) has been defined as "the degree of interlocking between cleavage- specific organizations active in the corporate channel and party organizations mobilizing for electoral action" (Rokkan 1990: 142). In purely political terms, a corollary feature is that Dutch space of political competition has been historically dominated by class and religious divides. The mutual isolation and divisions were held together by elite cooperation and a 'spirit of accommodation' among political elites, the so-called model of 'consociational democracy' (Lijphart 1968).

During the mid-1960s, Dutch society underwent a process of rapid depillarization. Even though it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze this process in detail, one could cite the impact of individualization and secularization that has been transforming politics in most advanced industrial democracies during the past few decades. The direct result of these twin processes is that voters' party preferences and structural positions are becoming increasingly independent from one another (Franklin et al.,1992). As the dominant cleavages were losing much of their acuity, depillarization inevitably contributed to the re-formulation of the Dutch political arena. The party system gradually acquired features of a more conventional type of multipartyism. There was a proliferation of secular parties - Democrats 66 (D66), Socialist Party (SP), Green Left (GL) - that complemented the traditional Labour Party (PvdA) and the liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). In contrast, there was a contraction of religious political forces. In 1980, the Catholic People's Party (KVP), and the two main Calvinist parties, Christian Historicals and the Anti-Revolutionary Party merged into the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), in an attempt to address the challenge of a growingly secularized polity. The national election of 2002 was another major turning point for Dutch politics. The unprecedented meteoric rise of populist politician Pim Fortuyn, and the electoral success of his party (LPF), coupled with his assassination only nine days before the polls, caused an earthquake in the Dutch party system (Kriesi and Frey 2008: 163). The sudden decline of LPF was balanced out by the rise of the Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom (PVV) in 2005, signalling that the
right-wing populist agenda of Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant positions is here to stay.

The question that has repeatedly been examined in the relevant literature is to what extent the religious and class cleavages that structured Dutch political space have been replaced by new cleavages in its contemporary phase. Numerous studies reveal a wealth of different and often contradicting findings, in some cases perhaps reflecting not just different temporal focus but also the effects of different methodological strategies. For example, some studies identify only two-dimensions of conflict: the socio-economic left-right, and a libertarian-cosmopolitan-multicultural/authoritarian-nationalist-monocultural dimension that has succeeded the classic religious-secular conflict (Kriesi and Frey 2008a: 172; Pellikaan et al. 2003). Pennings and Keman (2003) also put forth a two-dimensional model, where the left–right dimension is complemented by a second dimension, the progressive–conservative axis. Finally, a recent study focuses on the issues of immigration and post-materialism and even though they argue that both issues should not be underestimated, they conclude that they have not yet developed into cleavages and therefore it is not clear what type of cleavage, if any, has come to replace the old ones (Andeweg and Irwin 2005: 39-41).

Our first expectation is that there will be an equal amount of dispersion of parties along both the economic and cultural-political axes. Furthermore, we expect that the cultural-political axis will be determined by ‘older’ categories in the elections of the 1990s, whereas nativism should emerge as the most important structuring category in the 2004 and the 2009 EP elections, which followed the 2002 election, a significant election that is usually credited with the transformation of ideological space in the Netherlands.

**Italy**
The fact that our analysis begins in 1994 means that we are dealing with a radically new party system. Even though the Italian party system is the newest of all six (even newer than in later democratizers Greece and Hungary), the new configuration quickly developed a bipolar structure which maintains to this day.

As is well known, the party system that collapsed was dominated by the Christian Democratic party (DC). The Christian Democrats represented moderate conservatism and became the hegemonic force in post-war Italian politics due to
two interrelated factors. The first was Italy’s electoral system of pure proportional representation that allowed even the smallest parties to be represented in parliament, resulting in the fragmentation of Italy’s political forces into too many parties. Most governments were therefore made up of weak and unstable inter-party coalitions. The second related factor was that eligibility for inclusion in these government coalitions did not extend to the two extremes of the political competition space, the 'antisystem' communists (the second largest political force in Italy) and the 'neofascists' of the Italian Social Movement (MSI) to the right of DC. As a self-declared 'anti-communist and anti-fascist' force, as well as the largest party in any electoral contest until 1994, the DC was able to occupy the political center and dominate democratic politics by always serving as the major partner in successive coalition governments (Pappas 2001: 235).

After forty years in government, the DC became the main cog in a machinery of systemic corruption. Following the Tangentopoli affair4, the DC fragmented into three main parties: the Italian People’s Party (PPI), which was under the leadership of Romano Prodi; the conservative Christian Democratic Center/United Christian Democrats (CCD/CDU); and the Christian Social Party (CS). The latter disappeared completely as it was quickly absorbed by the other parties. Subsequently, the PPI joined center-left coalitions, while the CCD/CDU sought collaborations with parties on the right. Finally, a smaller group within DC chose to move even farther to the right by forming a coalition with the MSI. The MSI seized the political opportunity of the dissolution of the DC and its own strong performance in the local elections of 1993 and rebaptized itself as the National Alliance (AN) under the leadership of the party’s secretary, Gianfranco Fini (Tsatsanis 2006: 125). The dissolution of DC, the formation of Forza Italia (FI) by Silvio Berlusconi, and the 'refoundation' of the Communist Party as the (more legitimate) Party of the Democratic Left (PDS) formed the main components for the creation of two coalition camps, led by FI and PDS respectively, that put an end to the one-party dominant system of the post-war era and inaugurated an era of multiparty bipolar politics.

4 Tangentopoli (Italian for bribeville) was the name generally used to refer to the corruption-based political system that ruled Italy until the mani pulite (clear hands) investigation delivered it a deadly blow in 1992, leading to the demise of the DC and of the Socialist Party (PSI).
Even though the post-war Italian party system was marked by a dual cleavage structure where class and religion predominated (Bellucci and Heath 2007: 5), partisan dealignment and organizational fluidity do not allow us to posit more specific hypotheses about the structure and content of contemporary ideological space in Italian politics. We retain our more general hypotheses about the two-dimensional structure of the ideological space (even though the continuing fragmentation of the party system are likely to elevate badness-of-fit values) and increasing significance of the ideological categories belonging to the nationalism-postnationalism axis. Nevertheless, because of the existence of pre-electoral coalitions based on a bipolar left-right configuration, one should expect some degree of polarization along the economic axis. In addition, the presence of AN (before its dissolution into PdL) and, especially, of LN are expected to increase polarization along the cultural-political axis.

**Greece**

Even though the party system of Greece is relatively new, created after the return to democracy in 1974, memories of the political divisions of the pre-authoritarian period continued to condition the understanding of Greek politics and to shape political identities long after regime transition. It has been argued that Greek political space has been characterized by a three-pronged (left-center-right) unidimensional structure and a single cleavage, with its exact point of division along the single axis shifting according to the historical juncture (Moschonas 1994). The post-German occupation civil war created a schism between communists vs. anticommunists that replaced the dominant interwar division of republicans vs. royalists (or Venizelists vs. Anti-Venizelists), thus shifting the line of separation towards the left end of the left-right axis. The protracted monopolization and abuse of political power by conservative political forces eventually shifted the line of separation back toward the right end of the political spectrum through the emergence of a right-antiright cleavage in the 1960s, with the antiright bloc encompassing both forces of the left and of the political center (Moschonas 1994: 167-170).

Despite the apparent straightforward intelligibility of the unidimensional left-right space, it should be noted that in the case of Greece the content of this dimension never quite corresponded to its classic definition and understanding.
Even though political divisions in Greece forged resilient identities, they never amounted to full cleavages - in the strict sense - due to the exceptionally weak structural anchoring of both political identities and voting choices. The absence of a sizeable industrial working class due to late industrialization, coupled with the post-war regime of quasi-authoritarianism meant that the left-right axis was primarily understood in terms of a conflict over socio-political values and not as outright class conflict (Tsatsanis 2009: 39). Most of the parties that appeared after the end of the colonels' regime in 1974 were new but with clearly discernible ties to pre-authoritarian political life. After the first two elections of the post-authoritarian period in the 1970s, which were characterized by a relatively high degree of fluidity, the Greek party system was dominated once again by three blocs (left-center left-center right) (Lyrintzis 2005: 244) but started to develop even stronger majoritarian tendencies. The shift of the ideological equilibrium to the left of the spectrum, that lasted at least until the 1990s, can be attributed to a relative radicalization of the Greek electorate generated by the seven-year experience of right-wing authoritarianism. In the 1980s there was a swift move towards two-partyism, with the party of the center-left (PASOK) and the party of the center-right (New Democracy) regularly capturing over 80% of the vote in parliamentary elections. The third bloc, consisting of a united or (more commonly) fragmented communist left continued to struggle, with an electoral strength that hovered around 10% of the vote and seats in parliament, a tendency that persists to this day.

Our national specific hypotheses in the case of Greece relate first to the dimensionality of the Greek party system. Recasting the received wisdom of previous studies and following the findings of Tsatsanis (2009), we hypothesize that Greek political space is two-dimensional, not unidimensional, albeit with the cultural-political dimension being of much greater importance than the economic one. In other words, polarization along the cultural axis is expected to be significantly more acute than polarization along the economic axis. The comparatively extreme leftward tendencies in economic issues for all political parties as well as voters have also been documented in previous studies (Tsatsanis 2006, 2009), and lead us to hypothesize close proximity between all parties and the issue of welfare, with the latter emerging more like a valence issue. Once again, our hypothesis about globalization-related issues does not deviate from our more general hypothesis; following the findings of Teperoglou et al. (2010), we expect
them to be aligned with and to be gradually replacing more traditional cultural-political issues, especially after the emergence onto the Greek political scene of right-wing populist LAOS during the last decade.

**Hungary**

As in most post-communist democracies, the political landscape in Hungary was very fluid in the first years of the 1990s. The parties that dominated the first parliamentary elections of the post-communist era in 1990 were the conservative Democratic Forum (MDF) and the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), two parties that were quickly relegated to the status of junior coalition partners following subsequent elections. Since the late 1990s, there has been an apparent move towards the consolidation of a more classic two-and-a-half party system, with the center-left Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the center-right Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz) assuming their place as the two major parties in Hungarian politics.

However, tendencies of bipolarism were perhaps evident since the beginning of the post-transition years. Since the first elections, there has been a, more or less, steady alternation in government between right-wing and socialist-liberal coalitions (Fowler 2003: 800). This alignment of political forces in terms of left and right does not mean that political competition in Hungary reflects primarily a divide over economic policy or a deep-seated class conflict. A quick look at the composition of the opposed camps can be quite instructive about the nature of the dominant cleavage that structures political space in the country. The fact that the liberal SZDSZ is the default coalition partner of the socialists, not of Fidesz or any other right-wing party, is probably testament to the reality that the decisive element that has been conditioning coalition formation thus far is proximity of parties on cultural issues, not convergence of their economic agendas.

The economic liberalization policies carried through by the communist regime before its downfall blunted the issue of economic reform. The MZSP, as the communist successor party, could claim a credible commitment to economic reform, making it less attractive for other political parties to focus their appeal primarily on economic issues (Kitschelt et al. 1999: 234). In the search of more politically lucrative divisions, politicians in new parties chose to adopt culturally conservative, populist and often xenophobic positions, contrasting their agendas to
the cosmopolitan and libertarian positions of other parties. Fidesz led this populist turn in the early to mid-1990s, which has been credited to a large extent for its later electoral success (Enyedi 2006: 179). The split in the MDF and the creation of the right-wing populist Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP) in 1993, as well as the emergence and subsequent success of the ultra-nationalist Movement for a Better Hungary (JOBBIK) in 2003, conform to the broader hypothesis that polarization in Hungarian politics is gradually becoming more acute when it comes to identity and value issues.

Our hypotheses concerning the case of Hungary do not deviate from our more general hypotheses. We expect that globalization-related issues will tend to be aligned with the standard cultural dimension. Furthermore, following the findings of Kitschelt and his coauthors (1999), we expect that differentiation along the economic dimension will be comparatively low, whereas greater polarization will tend to be observed along the cultural-political dimension. This tendency is expected to be even stronger in the 2009 election due to the introduction of JOBBIK in European elections.

Findings
In this section we discuss our findings for each country per election by observing the main configurations of political parties and ideological categories as they appear on our unfolding models. For presentation purposes, we have rotated the two-dimensional plots in a way that the economic axis is arranged horizontally, always running from left to right (welfare state economy to economic liberalism). At this point, we should once again point out that the distances between parties and ideological categories represent relative distances. In other words, we can only say that a party adopts culturally liberal positions only if it is located very close to that category, not necessarily because it is located in the upper end of the configuration (cf. Dolezal 2008a: 73). Again, we begin our discussion with Germany and the United Kingdom, the only two countries for which our analysis begins with the first EP election of 1979.

Germany (1979-2009)
The dimensionality of the ideological space and political competition in Germany, generally conforms to our nationally-specific hypotheses. The first important
finding is that we observe in Germany a two-dimensional space of conflict. Raw stress values significantly drop from a single to a two-dimensional solution to below 0.2 in every single case, with the exception of 1984, where the stress value is low even in the one-dimensional solution. The economic dimension, which corresponds to the traditional class cleavage, clearly constitutes a structuring dimension in Germany. In fact, in the election of 1984 (see Figure 1f), the economic dimension appears to be the only important one. Our exceptional case is in accordance with previous analyses (e.g. Klingemann 1999), which posit that the left-right divide is the only prominent one in the German political competition. However, it should be noted that in the elections 2009, 1989, and 1979, there are clear leftward tendencies for most parties, with welfare strongly appearing as a valence category (see Figures 1a, 1e, 1g).

The second dimension of political conflict is composed by the traditional cultural-political ideological categories of our study (*political authoritarianism* vs. *cultural liberalism*) in several cases (see Figures 1a, 1c, 1e), a finding that is in line with our expectations concerning the importance of the *religious-secular* cleavage in Germany. However, the traditional cultural-political categories are far from being the only ones that structure the second dimension of German ideological space. Environmental protection and anti-growth politics emerged in the 1990s (following also the growth of the Green party) as an important structuring category of the second dimension, and by 2009 one could say that the environment has been transformed into a valence issue.

The EP election of 1989 (which also the only year in which the Republikaner party is included in our analysis) also led to the emergence of nativism as a polarizing category (see Figure 1e). Taking into account the fact that this ideological category corresponds largely to the issue of immigration, we can deduce that nativism became in Germany an important dimension with the rise of refugees and asylum-seekers in the early 1990s. In relation to the nationalism-postnationalism axis, nativism is the only category that often contributes to the content of the cultural-political dimension (with the partial exception of economic integration in 1979 and 1999). As discussed in the country discussion above, none of the German relevant parties of our study have endorsed 'hard' Eurosceptic positions (with the exception of the REP in 1989). The political aspects of integration have never been a polarizing issue for German parties; Euroscepticism
in German party politics is mainly expressed by individual politicians and is not translated into party policies (Busch & Knelangen 2004: 89).

A final set of findings relates to the movements of parties across time. The SPD maintains economically leftist positions and often culturally libertarian positions but since the entry of PDS/Die Linke into the political system, it tends to move closer to the center of the economic axis. In regard to the position of the FDP, our findings are totally in line with the position that by the mid-1990s the party give up its libertarian position and presented itself as closer to economic liberalism (Dolezal 2008b: 231). Both parties of the Union have rather stable positions close to authoritarianism and nativism (although CSU is rather closer than CDU). However, the most impressive transformation is probably the shift toward economic liberalism and the abandonment of pro-welfare positions for CDU after the 1989 EP election; until then, the positions of the party on the economic axis had been close or even to the left of SPD.

*United Kingdom (1979-2009)*
The EP election of 2009 (see Figure 2a) reveals a party system clearly structured by two dimensions: the economic dimension, with Labour at the left end and the Conservatives and UKIP at the right end. The content of the second dimension conforms rather perfectly with our main hypothesis: it is dominated by the issues of economic integration (on the one end) and nativism and euroscepticism (on the other). The inclusion of UKIP and BNP, which are comfortable located at the 'nationalism' end of the axis, certainly contribute to this alignment. The Liberal party emerges as the most 'postnational' party in this election, as in every single election since 1999 (see Figures 2b, 2c). Overall, in relation to Germany, the content of the second dimension is much more determined by our globalization-related categories, and especially euroscepticism and economic integration, but with nativism also strongly entering the picture, especially with the advent of the BNP in the last elections. This is no surprise given the well known Eurosceptic tendencies of many political parties in Britain. The transformation of the content of the cultural-political dimension is accelerated in the 1990s, a fact also reflected in changes in the salience of the globalization debate in the post-Maastricht period (see Figure 7).
The results of our analysis are in line with the findings of Kriesi and Frey (2008b) in relation to the structuring of the second dimension by integration-demarcation issues. However, we have not discovered a 'slow transformation' of the cultural-political axis, with globalization-related categories replacing the more traditional cultural liberalism-authoritarianism axis (Kriesi and Frey 2008b: 204). Instead, we find that the party system in the elections of 1979 and 1984 (see Figures 2f, 2g) can be best described as unidimensional, with the single economic axis accounting for almost all variance (the raw stress value for an one-dimensional solution for 1979 is 0.04 and for 1984 is 0.17).

The movement of parties conforms to the widespread views about the changes in the orientations of the Labour and Conservative parties, especially in regard to issues related to Europe (see Rosamond 2003). Like many leftist parties, the Labour party initially adopted Eurosceptic anti-integration positions, only to become a pro-integration political force along with the Liberal party. In contrast, the Conservatives, which traditional contain both pro-European and Eurosceptic factions within their party, initially adopted more pro-European stances, only to shift to Euroscepticism in the late Thatcherite period (cf. Spiering 2004:131).

Netherlands (1994-2009)

The unfolding models for the four EP elections in the Netherlands reveal considerable confirmation of our main research hypotheses. In all the four EP elections, we observe a clear two-dimensional space of conflict. Raw stress values drop significantly when moving from a single to a two-dimensional solution to below 0.2 in all cases. The first striking result that emerges for the configuration of parties and issues in all elections, save the 1999 election, is that there seems to be very little differentiation in the positioning of parties along the economic dimension. Welfare state economy and environmentalism emerge as valence issues with the occasional exception of the VVD and CDA (as well as the two right-wing populist parties, LPF and PVV in 2004 and 2009 respectively), which are not as close to welfare in most cases but never clearly adopt economically liberal positions either. The 1999 EP election (see Figure 3c) is the only one where there appears to be greater dispersion of parties along the economic dimension, and the only time where a party (CDA) can be seen as adopting a liberal economic agenda. In addition, the consistent proximity between environmentalism and welfare suggests, contrary to
our expectations, that there is an overlap between the economic and the 'new politics' dimensions.

Going back to 1994 (see Figure 3d), the configuration that emerges partially contradicts the findings of previous studies (Kriesi and Frey 2008a: 176; Van der Brug 1999:161) concerning the ideological heterogeneity of the 'purple coalition' (PvdA, VVD, D66). The analysis of the Euromanifestos data (in contrast to the analysis of references in the press and voter perceptions in the other studies) depict the three parties located extremely close to each other in the specific election, combining pro-welfare, pro-environment, pro-integration and culturally liberal positions.

The second main trend is related to the content of the second dimension. As in the case of the United Kingdom, the categories of the nationalism-postnationalism axis appear to contribute greatly, if not determine, this vector of ideological space. The main difference with the UK is that identity and immigration issues (captured by our nativism category) appear to typically provide the 'lower' end of the second axis instead of euroscepticism. The 'upper' end of the second vector corresponds, in most cases, to cultural liberalism and economic integration, reflecting the mixture of 'old' and 'new' issues of the cultural-political axis and confirming, once again, our hypothesis about the latent variable that structures orientation on the issue of economic integration. In the last EP elections of 2009 (see Figure 3a), the second dimension is structured exclusively by all three of the 'globalization' categories. We cannot confirm the finding of a previous study (Kriesi and Frey 2008a: 172) that the globalization categories have transformed the meaning of the cultural-political dimension because our data stretch back only as far as 1994. However, if we assume that the ideological space had a two-dimensional structure even before the 1990s, such a transformation would seem to be a likely development. The picture that emerges concerning the location of parties on this vector is much easier to interpret than positions along the economic axis. There is an integrationist and culturally liberal bloc consisting of PvdA, D66, Green Left and, to a lesser extent, VVD, contrasted with the left Euroscepticism of the Socialist Party and the right Euroscepticism of List Pim Fortuyn (2004) and PVV (2009). The position of the Christian Democratic parties (CDA and CU/SGP) appears to vary according to the content of the cultural-political dimension. When the content of the dimension is structured by the ideological categories that contain issues related to economic and
political integration (*euroscepticism* and *economic integration*) as in 2009 and (partially) in 1999, the two parties generally tend to belong to the integrationist camp. Conversely, when the dimension is structured by identity and values issues (*nativism*, *cultural liberalism*, *authoritarianism*) as in 1994 and 2004, the two parties are positioned closer to the nationalist/authoritarian end of the spectrum.

*Italy (1994-2009)*

The first thing that should be noted about the unfolding models of the Italian elections is that they render acceptable fits for all two-dimensional solutions (raw stress values around or below 0.20), which means that the ideological space in Italy retained a basically dual structure. In 1994, in the EP election that was conducted only a few months after the first national election of the restructured party system, what emerges is a picture of relative moderation along all relevant vectors (see Figure 4d). In the economic dimension there is some differentiation, with *Lega Nord* (LN) adopting the most rightward position, whereas *Alleanza Nazionale* (AN) and the *Partito Popolare Italiano* (PPI) adopting economically leftist stances. The new *Forza Italia* (FI) and the *Partito Democratico della Sinistra* (PDS) emerge as centrist parties that blend pro-welfare with economically liberal positions. Similarly, all parties adopt relatively pro-integration positions, with the exceptions of AN, which comes closer to the *authoritarian* and *nativism* categories and the only outlier, *Rifondazione Comunista* (RC), which positions itself as the only Eurosceptic party.

High levels of organizational fluidity in the following elections make the task of trend detection extremely difficult. In the 1999 and 2004 elections we have the appearance of new parties the autonomous existence of which was short-lived; most of them were absorbed into new parties or coalitions in subsequent elections (e.g. Democrats, FLI/PRI, UD. EUR). Following our criterion of inclusion which is securing representation in the European Parliament in the election under consideration, combined with the availability of stand-alone coded Euromanifestos, forced us to include a large number of parties in our analysis that often appear only once. Moderation in economic issues continues to be the rule in subsequent elections (see Figures 4a, 4b, 4c), however, some interesting observations can be singled out. FI makes a noteworthy shift towards economic liberalism in 1999 and 2004, but moves back into a more moderate position in the 2009 EP election after
its merger with AN into the Popolo della Libertà (PdL). The PDS (in 2004 examined only as part of the *Ulivo* coalition due to the unavailability of separate manifestos, and in 2009 competing as *Partito Democratico* (PD), following its merger with *La Margherita*) oscillating between centrist and leftist economic positions, reflecting its many changes in leadership and programmatic identity.

In comparison with the previous countries, the configuration of the cultural-political axis is less straightforward and stable. *Cultural liberalism* and *authoritarianism* often contribute to the signification of this dimension (see especially Figures 4b,4c for years 2004 and 1999), reflecting the classic cultural divide (religious-secular cleavage). The paradox is that *authoritarianism* is often aligned not only with *nativism* (which is expected) but also with *economic integration*. This creates a situation where the main party of the center-left appears to adopt simultaneously pro-integration and authoritarian positions (see PDS/PD in 1999 and 2009). This inverse alignment in the cultural-political axis can be also observed in Greece, the only other Southern European country under consideration in this paper.

**Greece (1999-2009)**

In the EP elections of 2004 and 2009 (see Figures 5b, 5a) there is a peculiar alignment of authoritarianism and pro-integration positions, a fact that reflects the major conservative party's (ND) steady proximity to both ideological categories. In fact, New Democracy is the only party that is very close to the authoritarian category in every election, due to the fact that law and order, together with defense, are consistently high on the party's priority list. The main representative of Euroscepticism in Greece remains the Communist Party (KKE), the only unreformed communist party left in Europe which still embraces hardline antisystemic rhetoric and continues to embrace Stalinist symbolism. The proximity between nativism and Euroscepticism, and their contribution to the content of the cultural-political axis in 1999 and 2004 (see Figures 5c, 5b) conforms to our main hypothesis about the directionality of the 'globalization' categories and, in the case of Greece, can be explained by two factors. The first is that KKE has moved towards culturally protectionist and anti-immigration positions since the early 1990s, reflecting a more general strategic choice to rely upon a more explicitly national-populist agenda. The second factor has been the advent of right-wing
populist LAOS onto the political scene, the second Eurosceptic party in Greece, which has increased the relevance of its flagship issues: immigration and protection of the national culture (the issues corresponding to our nativism category).

Our hypothesis concerning the leftward tendencies of the Greek party system on the economic dimension are partially confirmed. In most elections welfare emerges as a valence issue for all parties, with the exception of ND in 1999, which espouses very liberal, economically, positions and LAOS in 2009, which becomes an outlier party in economic policy terms. Otherwise, the location of parties on the economic dimension are more or less as expected. Another important observation related to the alignment between our 'new politics' category (environmentalism) and welfare state economy, meaning that, as in the Netherlands, the 'new politics' and the economic dimension overlap simplifying the ideological space. Thus, as reflected in the low raw stress scores (0.15 for 1999 and 2004, 0.17 for 2009), Greece might have developed a more complicated structure than the unidimensional one that had been identified in past decades (see discussion above), but probably one does not need to go beyond two dimensions to capture the complexity of contemporary Greek politics.

Hungary (2004-2009)
As a new member of the European Union, Hungary had the opportunity to participate only in two EP elections since its accession in 2004. Obviously, the study of only two elections in a time frame of five years does not allow us to identify any meaningful trends in a party system that is, any way you look at it, very new.

In both configurations, the raw stress scores are very low (0.04 for 2004 and 0.12 for 2009), allowing us to conclude that there is a clear two-dimensional conflict. From the representation of the Hungarian relevant parties and the ideological categories of our study into the common political space, we observe that our hypotheses concerning the case of Hungary do not deviate from our more general hypotheses. The first and most important conclusion is that the globalization-related issues tend to be uniformly aligned with the cultural-political dimension, with the exception of euroscepticism in the 2004 EP election. Furthermore, our country-specific hypothesis concerning the different levels of dispersion along the two axes appear to be fully confirmed for both elections (see
Figures 6a and 6b). In 2009, all four parties are concentrated on the left end of the economic axis, with all parties exhibiting similar rejection of economic liberalism. This picture is somewhat different from 2004, when there was a clearer differentiation between the parties, with the socialists (MZSP) and the conservative Democratic Forum (MDF) adopting more welfare-friendly positions, and Fidesz and SZDSZ adopting more liberal economic agendas. For MDF and Fidesz at least, the observation that positions on cultural issues are more important than convergence on economic agendas is confirmed; the unexpectedly nationalist/authoritarian position of the MZSP on the cultural-political axis does not allow the same observation to be confirmed by our data for socialist-liberal alliance of MZSP-SZDSZ. Finally, our last country-specific hypothesis concerning the expected increase in polarization through the entry of JOBBIK in 2009 is partially confirmed: JOBBIK as expected occupies a position close to the eurosceptic end of the axis but, other than that, we see a near complete coincidence of the positions of the two major parties, MZSP and Fidesz.

Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have tried to investigate the thesis that orientations of political actors on the economic, cultural and political aspects of globalization and Europeanization tend to be expressed in the form of ideological preferences along a common underlying dimension. We have named this dimension the ‘nationalism-postnationalism axis’, while others have developed akin conceptualizations which, in reality, constitute similar polarities under different headings: the globalization-antiglobalization, demarcation-integration, or cosmopolitanism-communitarianism divide. In addition, we have posited that this divide will tend to be embedded in the classic ideological space, structured by the two broadly conceived traditional conflicts: an economic conflict over distributional preferences, reflecting the historical class cleavage; and a cultural-political conflict informed by different value divides (religiosity vs. secularism, cultural liberalism vs. conservatism, political authoritarianism vs. libertarianism, etc.). We hypothesized that the nature of this globalization-inspired nationalism-postnationalism divide will lead to a specific route of embedment into national ideological spaces: the different components of the nationalism-postnationalism divide will tend to transform the content of the traditional cultural-political dimension.
Our six-country analysis produced some interesting results. To begin with, in all six countries our general expectation concerning the dual structure of ideological space was largely confirmed with a few minor exceptions. Furthermore, our transformation hypothesis was a much better fit for the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Hungary. In the other three countries, while there are some signs that the globalization debate informs to varying extents the structure of the ideological space in some elections, we cannot conclude with similar confidence that the nationalism-postnationalism divide is supplanting more traditional concerns related to the cultural-political dimension. However, we could say that the location within the ideological space of the three categories that we associate with the nationalism-postnationalism divide (nativism, economic integration, euroscepticism) exhibit tendencies towards unidimensionality in all six countries. Even the nominally economic category of the axis (i.e. economic integration) election after election cross-nationally was located in an orthogonal position to the classic distributional categories (i.e. welfare state economy vs. economic liberalism).

On the other hand, our measurement of the salience of the globalization debate in each country per EP election, did not reveal any clear trends concerning the level of importance of the debate. Of course, our limited time frame was perhaps not suitable from the beginning for such comparisons. In Germany and the UK, for which our time frame spans three decades, we cannot discern any sustained trend. However, a modest trend does exist in both countries when comparing the average level of salience between the pre-Maastricht and post-Maastricht period. In our other countries the time frame was 15 years or less, which obviously do not allow us to talk about any long-term trends. For example, the observation that salience levels have been dropping from their late 1990s highs in the two South European countries of our analysis is noteworthy, but should not lead one to assume that the globalization debate is on the track of losing its polarizing edge. After all, the current national debt crisis that has impacted Southern Europe and the rest of the continent can serve as another reminder of how an increasing number of issues that enter the national political agenda are framed in terms of global politics.
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Euromanifestos Handbook 2009 (Euromanifestos Coding Scheme/ EMCS III)


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### Table 1. EU and Globalization-related scores (2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Net benefit per capita</th>
<th>Pro-European Attitudes</th>
<th>Globalization index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-1045</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>84,16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2238</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>75,83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>37%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>39%</td>
<td>82,26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>77%</td>
<td>91,90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>-937</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>80,18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
(1) For the net benefit per capita, the data are taken from the “Open Europe briefing note: European Communities (Finance) Bill, 2007”, available at: [http://www.openeurope.org.uk/research/budget07.pdf](http://www.openeurope.org.uk/research/budget07.pdf)
(2) Pro-European Attitudes: the data present the positive evaluations of the EU- membership (“membership a good thing”), Eurobarometer 67, spring 2007
(3) KOF Index of Globalization -2007 (ETH Zurich). The globalization index measures the economic, social and political dimensions of globalization. For more details see [http://www.globalization-index.org/](http://www.globalization-index.org/)
Table 2. Ideological categories and issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideological categories/Abbreviations</th>
<th>Issues used for calculation of ideological category scores (positive minus negative quasi-sentences)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Environmentalism** *environment* | Positive: Environmental protection; anti-growth politics; steady state economy; ecologism; ‘Green Politics’  
Negative: Any opposite mentions of positive |  
| **Euroscepticism** *euscept*       | Positive: Hostile references to Europe or the EU; no “deepening of Europe” necessary; a more integrated Europe and the transfer of power to EU is rejected; hostile reference to the European Parliament and its MEPs, the European Commission, the European Court of Justice and other EU institutions; required unanimity in the European Council  
Negative: Favourable references to Europe or the EU; “deepening of Europe” necessary; a more integrated Europe and the transfer of power to EU is supported; desirability of expanding the competences of EU institutions; positive reference to the European Parliament and its MEPs, the European Commission, the European Court of Justice and other EU institutions; required majority voting in the European Council (democratisation and more efficiency in decision making within EU) |  
| **Cultural Liberalism** *cultlib*  | Positive: Opposition to traditional moral values; support for divorce, abortion etc.; favorable mentions, support or assistance for homosexuals and women; any other mentions opposite of negative  
Negative: Favorable references to traditional moral values; prohibition, censorship and suppression of immorality stability of family; religion; negative references to homosexuals and women. |  
| **Economic Integration** *econintgr* | Positive: Favorable references to or support for the Single European Market and the European Monetary Union; favorable reference to labor migration and support for the concept of free trade; support or accept national contributions to finance the EU or its policies; maintain or extend EU funds for structurally underdeveloped areas;  
Negative: Negative references to or rejection of the Single European Market and the European Monetary Union; negative reference to labor migration and positive mentions to protect internal markets; national contributions to finance the EU or its policies are criticized or rejected; cutback or suspension of funds for structurally underdeveloped areas. |  
| **Economic Liberalism** *econlib*  | Positive: Favourable references to free enterprise; need for wage and tax policies to induce enterprise, privatisation*; negative reference to: corporatism; direct government control of economy; social ownership*; publicly-owned industry*; socialist property*; nationalization, market regulation, Marxist analysis  
Negative: Any opposite mentions of positive; positive references to: corporatism; direct government control of economy; social ownership*; publicly-owned industry*; socialist property*; nationalization, market regulation, Marxist analysis |  
| **Fiscal conservatism** *fiscalcon* | Positive: Need for traditional economic orthodoxy; e.g. reduction of budget deficits, support for strong currency; positive references to the European Central Bank  
Negative: Keynesian demand management: demand-oriented economic policy; devoted to the reduction of depression and/or to increase private demand etc; any negative references to economic orthodoxy and the European Central Bank |  
| **Nativism** *nativism*           | Positive: Enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration; any appeals to patriotism and/or nationalism; need to reduce immigration; negative references to or no support for immigrants and foreigners  
Negative: Cultural diversity; communalism; preservation of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages, against patriotism and/or nationalism; need to retain or increase immigration; positive |
| Political Authoritarianism | Enforcement of all laws; actions against crime; support and resources for police; fight against terrorism*; need to maintain or increase military expenditure; negative references to the importance of human and civil rights | Against the enforcement of all laws and the fight against terrorism; favorable reference to decreasing military expenditures; disarmament; favorable reference to importance of human and civil rights; freedom of speech; supportive refugee policies |
| Welfare State Economy | Need to introduce, maintain or expand any social service or social security scheme; the concept of equality; fair treatment of all people and special protection for underprivileged; references to labor groups; specific measures for supporting the expansion of the welfare state (pensions, health care and nursing service, social housing, child care) | Limiting expenditure on social services or social security; negative mentions to equality and fair treatment, or proposal to cutback or suspend specific measures for supporting the expansion of the welfare state |

*: only for 2004 and 2009 Euromanifestos
Figure 1a. Germany 2009

Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.13
Figure 1b. Germany 2004

Kruskal’s Stress-1: 0.14
Figure 1c. Germany 1999

Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.16
Figure 1d. Germany 1994

Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.15
Figure 1e. Germany 1989

Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.17
Figure 1f. Germany 1984

Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.13
Figure 1g. Germany 1979

Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.07
Figure 2a. UK 2009

Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.20
Figure 2b. UK 2004

Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.30
Figure 2c. UK 1999

Kruskal’s Stress-1: 0.22
Figure 2d. UK 1994

Kruskal’s Stress-I: 0.18
Figure 2e. UK 1989

Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.13
Figure 2f. UK 1984

Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.10
Figure 2g. UK 1979

Kruskal’s Stress-1: 0.01
Figure 3a. Netherlands 2009

Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.16
Figure 3b. Netherlands 2004

Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.15
Figure 3c. Netherlands 1999

Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.18
Figure 3d. Netherlands 1994

Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.13
Figure 4a. Italy 2009

Kruskal’s Stress-I: 0.13
Figure 4b. Italy 2004

Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.21
Figure 4c. Italy 1999

Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.21
Figure 4d. Italy 1994

Kruskal's Stress-I: 0.20
Figure 5a. Greece 2009

Kruskal’s Stress-1: 0.17
Figure 5b. Greece 2004

Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.15
Figure 5c. Greece 1999

Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.15
Figure 6a. Hungary 2009

Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.12
Figure 6b. Hungary 2004

Kruskal’s Stress-1: 0.04
Figure 7. The Salience of the Globalization Debate in Six Countries
(saliency of globalization-related issues- % of total)